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This work is meant to examine the M&A activity in Russia in the oil and gas industry, 
thus evaluating the long-term operational performance of the acquirer companies. 
Russia, as a world power in the energy industry and a reference among emerging 
markets, saw their companies, in the last two decades, to be restructured at an increasing 
pace through mergers and acquisitions. Using a sample of 224 domestic companies we 
gathered information for the period from 1999 until 2013. It should be noted that 
financial markets in Russia are not very liquid and only a few companies are listed, 
which prevents us from doing the analysis based on market returns. So, we are driven to 
use accounting information extracted from Orbis database. By using the GMM 
estimator we came to the conclusion that cross-border deals have a positive impact on 
the operational performance of Russian acquirers. However, when we look closer into 
the deal characteristics we found that the positive effect is no longer significant. 
Nevertheless cross-border deals within the same industry and in former USSR countries 
have significant negative impact on the performance of acquirers.  
Key-words: Russia, M&A, Energy Industry  




Este trabalho tem como objetivo principal analisar a atividade de M&A na Rússia na 
indústria de petróleo e gás natural, avaliando assim a performance operacional de longo-
prazo das empresas aderentes a M&A. Uma potência mundial na área energética, e uma 
referência entre os mercados emergentes, nas últimas duas décadas, viu as suas 
empresas serem restruturadas a um ritmo crescente através de fusões e aquisições. 
Usando uma amostra de 224 empresas nacionais reunimos a informação no período de 
1999 até 2013. É de notar que o mercado financeiro na Rússia tem uma liquidez muito 
baixa e são poucas as empresas que estão cotadas, o que nos impossibilita fazer a 
análise baseada nos retornos de mercado. Somos, pois, levados a usar informação 
contabilística extraída da base de dados Orbis. Ao utilizar o estimador GMM chegamos 
à conclusão de que negócios internacionais têm um impacto positivo sobre o 
desempenho operacional dos compradores russos. No entanto, quando olhamos mais de 
perto para as características dos negócios chegamos a conclusão que o efeito positivo 
deixa de ser significativo. No entanto, negócios internacionais dentro da mesma 
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1. Introduction  
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is a relatively new strategic theory as a concept. 
Nevertheless, in the last century, several waves of M&A led to a gradual substantial 
industrial restructuring in all parts of the world what has attracted increasing attention in 
view of the growth of its effects on corporate structures. The details and consequences 
of the businesses draw attention not only of the participants (acquirer and acquired) but 
also from investors, politicians, academics and other stockholders. 
Russia, as a world power, is an interesting geographic reference to analyze whether 
M&A activity is relevant and increase company’s value. If not, what are the reasons that 
could explain it?  
Given the Russian History as a nation and respective economic conditions, it gives us a 
great and fascinating case to work with. Knowing that it is an emerging economy and 











Figure 1: Russian M&A deal value and volume, 2006-2013 (KPMG 2014) 
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In 2013 Russian companies announced 320 deals in the value of $108,4 billion. While 
this represents an overall decline in both deal volume (6,43%) and value (20,59%), it 
should be noticed that 2012 was a record breaking year following Rosneft’s blockbuster 
$56 billion acquisition of TNK-BP – the largest deal ever announced in Russia.   
Hence, we can identify the trend of strong growth in M&A activity in Russia. Excluding 
the Rosneft / TNK-BP deal in 2013, it showed a year-on-year increase of 35% in M&A 
value of the deal (according to the graph this was the highest level since 2007). Russia's 
performance strength can be seen when compared to the European M&A deal which 
saw values fall 12% from $893 billion in 2012 to $783 billion in 2013. 
The graph above shows how several geopolitical issues have had an impact on the 
M&A activity. The crisis of 2008 only showed the effect in the next year, with a drastic 
drop of 37,5% (volume) or 42,99% (value). The offset of one year can be explained by 
the fact that some of deals that were closed in 2008 has had started in 2007 already. 
The current political crisis between Russian and Ukrainian governments, another more 
recent event, has enormous impact on Russians economy and currency, started to show 
the impact in 2013 with the drop from $136.5 billion to $108.4 billion in value of M&A 
deals. 
Russia is one of the key players in the global energy market due to its abundant energy 
resources. As the figure 2 below shows, 33,1% of total value of deals in Russia were 
realized on Natural Sources Industry (which includes Oil & Gas). The present work 
aims to complement scarce empirical literature on M&A activity within Energy Industry 

















This study intends to answer to the following research questions:  
 If and under which conditions M&A deals benefit the performance of energy 
industry acquirers in Russia? 
 Which are the deal drivers in Oil and Gas industry in Russia?  
 How different deal and firm level characteristics moderate the effects of 
acquisitions? 
Hence, the main aim of this study is to analyze the M&A Activity in Russian’s Oil and 
Gas Sector. In order to achieve this goal it will be used a sample of Russians acquirers 
for the period from 1999 until 2013. During the analysis we wittingly restricted our 
sample to a different period because of the problems with the existing information for 
the Russian companies before 2004. In order to access the long term performance of the 
companies it is necessary to use at least three years after the deal. The source of the data 
is the Orbis database, but firstly it was used the Zephyr database to identify those 
acquirers and to obtain the information about the deals itself.  
Figure 2: Share of Sector in Total Value of Deals in Russia (2013). 
(EMISPRO 2014). 
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Since the profitability will be assessed (that could be at least partially persistent over 
time), we will need to use the lagged dependent variable. This will bring the problem of 
reverse causality and the correlation of the choice variable with the unobservables in the 
error term. Being the nature of our data a panel data and taking into account the 
economic relation of our dependent variable with the model, we applied the GMM 
estimator to overcome the problem of simultaneity and endogeneity biases.  
Regarding the model, our analysis will be restricted to an accounting profitability 
measure, Return on Assets (RoA), in order to overcome the problem of data collecting 
difficulties. The profitability of the firm is assumed to be a function of several firm 
determinants and deal specificities. Under these circumstances a count variable will be 
included to distinguish a single acquirer from a multiple acquirer in order to verify if the 
company can learn and improve with past deals or not. 
With respect to the firm characteristic, a lagged dependent variable will be considered 
to account for dynamic effects in performance. Moreover, we will include the firm size 
and solvency ratio in order to access whether firm’s resources and capabilities are in 
agreement with the ability of a firm to meet its obligations and to externally finance its 
activities. 
Given the importance of the state in Russia, a dummy variable will be employed to 
distinguish the state owned companies and otherwise. State-ownership can lead to lower 
performance due to lower internal efficiency incentives, stronger organizational 
rigidities, or non-profit maximizing behavior (Yarrow 1988, Megginson and Netter 
2001). 
By using the GMM estimator we came to the conclusion that cross-border deals have a 
positive impact on the operational performance of Russian acquirers. However, when 
we look closer into the deal characteristic we found that the positive effect is no longer 
significant. But cross-border deals within the same industry and in former USSR 
countries have significant negative impact on the performance of acquirers. Deals with 
targets from non-former USSR countries and within different industries do not exercise 
any effect. 
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Besides this chapter, this dissertation is structured as follows: in Chapter 2, a literature 
review of the topic is made. In section 2.1, some of the main theories will be presented 
and in 2.2, an overview of the energy sector in Russia, followed by the integration of 
this industry within M&A theory. In order to end the second chapter we will present a 
brief review of the similar studies. In Chapter 3 we will cover the methodological 
aspects such as sample, model and the method of estimation. Finally, we will be able to 


















2. Literature review  
In this section we will cover the main literature that was found about the topic in 
analysis. Starting by the M&A theory review, the key theories will be exposed as well 
as the essential contributions they have had on our research. Passing by some similar 
studies, we will conclude this section with a review of the Russian energy sector within 
M&A theory.  
 
2.1  Theoretical Background 
Within M&A there are several types of transactions. An accurate definition of M&A 
should include mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, tender offers, joint ventures, minority 
equity investments, divestitures, spin-offs, split-ups, carve-outs, leveraged buyouts, 
reorganizations, restructuring, and other adjustments. However the scope of our analysis 
will confine to Mergers, i.e. when the target becomes part of acquirer, in order to 
simplify the process of collection of the data.  
By looking into historical data we can verify that M&A activity takes place in waves. 
There are several factors that are able to provoke this waves, namely technological 
shock, legislation changes, escalating technologies prices, excess liquidity, low cost of 
capital or overvaluation of acquirer share price relative target’s price (Sudarsanam 
2003). 
In last two decades we have witnessed a boom in the M&A activity (Pryor 2001). Being 
characterized by a rapid growth, this type of deals contributed to a deep reconfiguration 
of firm’s organizational structure and core competencies as well as to the reshaping of 
industries (Bertrand and Zuniga 2006). 
There is a huge amount of literature about M&A activity effects. Regarding the effect 
on the target company, the theory suggests that they are the winners in this relationship. 
Nevertheless, regarding the effect on the acquirer company, there is no consensus. Some 
of empirical studies suggest that there is no gain for the acquirers because the synergies 
created after the deal go to the acquired company (Jensen and Ruback 1983).  
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Other studies show that it is possible the acquirer obtain gains but it depends on certain 
conditions, like companies characteristics, industry characteristics, geographic location, 
culture of the organization, and so on (Dutta and Jog 2009). Other studies still suggest 
that there is no gain in M&A activity, or at least the effect is irrelevant (Bertrand and 
Betschinger 2012).  
At this point, it is important to mention the agency theory that comes from the 
separation of ownership and management of organizations. It states that conflict of 
interest over the choice of corporate strategy between managers and shareholders can 
lead to very large costs. This situation is often a cause to M&A activity in order to 
reduce them (Jensen 1986). However, in last two decades capital markets became more 
competitive and improved shareholder control mechanisms. 
For the Russian acquirers, according to Bertrand and Betschinger (2012), both domestic 
and international acquisitions tend to reduce the performance of acquirers when 
compared to non-acquiring firms. Moreover they show that considering the firm 
specifics, industry and deal level characteristics, Russians acquirers suffer from the 
inability to leverage value due to low M&A experience and capability, especially when 
making international acquisitions.  
M&A over time was shown to have a major impact on the organization, powers and 
obviously the performance, both on the buyer and the acquired party. The key drivers 
through which M&A can increase the performance of purchasers are economies of scale 
and scope, more efficiency in capacity utilization, lower transaction costs compared 
with the market, acquisition and redistribution of new features and capabilities. All 
these sources of value creation in turn contribute to the increase in market power that a 
company can get (Gugler, Mueller et al. 2003). 
However, companies from emerging markets use more fiercely international mergers 
and acquisitions when compared to developed market companies. This instrument 
serves to raise the existing competitive advantages in the national or off border market, 
since their competitive disadvantages are larger and M&A offers a quick way to gain 
access to misplaced resources and assets and expand the corporate environment (Luo 
and Tung 2007). 
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Nevertheless, those firms that go abroad face several challenges that can outweigh the 
possible gains of internationalization. In the end, these obstacles can reduce the 
performance of the acquirers.  
Furthermore, there are still only few studies focused on emerging market companies. 
Bidders from emerging markets are often portrayed as being mainly motivated by a 
desire to extract knowledge from the target firms located abroad – instead of improving 
the target firms’ business – and apply it in their own domestic operations. This should 
not only lead to improved firm profitability at home, but also enhance the technological 
and economic development of their home country. The question, however, arises if this 
transfer of knowledge indeed takes place.  
A global analysis of the theory of M&A reveals that the aim of companies involved in 
mergers or acquisitions is the growth of its value, resulting from the achievement of 
positive synergies from the merger. However, according to estimates by various 
researchers, about two-thirds of mergers and acquisitions do not lead to the expected 
results. The main causes of failure are: technology incompatibility, companies with high 
levels of production disparity, the incompatibility of corporate cultures and strategic 
objectives, the expected synergy effects were too optimistic, overpayment for the target 
company, inadequate risk analysis and unnecessarily large costs transaction. 
Overall, acquisitions can generate value for acquirers throughout deal factors and 
characteristics of the firms (Dutta and Jog, 2009), as opposite to Bertrand and 
Betschinger (2012). In the next section we will present a brief portrait of the energy 







2.2 Russian Energy sector 
The oil and gas industry is the cornerstone of the Russian economy. Given the amount 
of the existing reserves it is obvious that in the future, Russia will not be able to replace 
this economy driver by another. Since 2007 Russia boarded on an ambitious program to 
reduce this reliance by building up high technology sectors, but with few results so far. 
The example of this new strategy was the Skolkovo Innovation Center also known as 
the Russian Silicon Valley. Currently under construction, it is a modern scientific and 
technological innovation complex for the development and commercialization of new 
technologies, the first "city of science" in Russia's post-Soviet era under construction 
"from scratch". 
In 2009 Russia was the world's largest exporter of natural gas and the second largest 
exporter of oil. This dependence on commodity exports makes Russia too exposed to 
the highly volatile global commodity prices, one of the events that we witness today. 
Observing the international magnitude of the Russian energy sector, it is highlighted the 
exceptional large part of the production that goes to exports of the country and feed a 
large part of the world. The EU region, thanks to its geographic location has 86% of gas 
imports originating from Russia.   
Nevertheless, it must be considered the proximity that the EU region has with the 
Western and Southeastern Europe as the gateway to new markets and business 
opportunities. In order to secure this income Russia has acquired several assets in EU 
and former Soviet Union states in the last few years. 
By gaining control over vital elements of infrastructure, such as pipelines and storage 
facilities, Russia’s main energy company, Gazprom, aims to secure regular and easy 
access for its products to the EU. Russian companies are trying to increase their 
resource base and incorporate strategic assets, as well as take advantage of local 
expertise and existing business networks. 
Since the crash of the Soviet Union, Russia has undertaken substantial changes. Moving 
gradually from an isolated economy to a more market-based and globally-integrated, the 
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process that is ongoing as we can see on our empirical study. The first reaction was the 
privatization wave of most of the industries in the 1990s, with prominent exceptions in 
the energy and defense-related sectors. The movement can be explained by extreme 
nationalism and the state's role in these two areas. The protection of certain industries 
stems from broader political and international relations. 
This phenomenon is not specific to Russia, it can be observed in both developed and 
developing countries in cases of oil firms, banks, and parts of the infrastructure sectors 
that are controlled by the state. However, private sector still remains subject to 
substantial state interfering and despite the mass privatization after the end of the Soviet 
Union, state-owned enterprises continue to be important in the Russian economy. 
Statistics show the breadth and weight of the energy industry in the national economy. 
However, as part of our analysis it is necessary to look beyond the numbers and 
consider the broader political and economic context within which the development of 
Russia is taking place. In this context becomes evident the importance that the state has 
in the most powerful Russian energy actors. 
Between 1998 and 2008 the price of oil on financial markets jumped from $ 9 to $ 141 
which influenced a lot the exports of this product in value and applies the same for 
natural gas, whose price is indexed to oil prices. Given this evolution in export earnings 
and the consequent increase in the value of national energy companies, the government 
saw a window of opportunity with companies that were once public. Government had 
been threatened by the growing power of businessmen in private companies now 
empowered with skills to influence politicians in power or govern the strategic assets in 
order to benefit themselves rather than the state as a whole. The solution was to recover 
some of the major companies that were privatized in the 90s. 
As a result of this strategy, in 2005, Gazprom, the number one in the industry, was back 
under control of the state, and in 2006 it was granted the legal monopoly of export of 
natural gas to Gazprom. In subsequent years it is notable the interest and the power of 
the Russian state in the energy industry. Only during the period of our analysis 
Gazprom made 144 deals of strategic asset acquisitions, thus reflecting the state will. 
Consequently, in 2008, 44% of industry was responding to the government orders. 
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In addition to the presence of government members in boards of directors on strategic 
companies, the state also examined the legislation for the sector regarding the use of 
subsoil banning foreign investors from controlling assets considered important to the 
state. Hereupon, in the next section we will englobe the energy sector within the 



















2.3 M&A within Russian Energy sector 
Mergers and acquisitions largely determined the structure of the current oil and gas 
sector in Russia. A considerable part of the country's hydrocarbon resources (oil, natural 
gas, coal etc.) accounted for the largest vertically integrated holdings, most of which 
adhere to the strategy of external growth (Butler 2011). What determines the relevance 
of mergers and acquisitions in this study is the impact on the effectiveness of individual 
oil and gas companies and the industry as a whole.     
This method of restructuring the acquired companies is especially popular in the oil and 
gas sector. The limited hydrocarbon reserves and growing capital intensity of its 
production explains why the majority of oil and gas companies, characterized by 
homogeneous products, low growth industry, and large-scale production, prefer the 
strategy of mergers and acquisitions than other ways to improve performance and, 
consequently, the competitiveness of the market. 
A special characteristic of the M&A process in the oil and gas sector in Russia is the 
presence of imperfect institutional environment that allows companies to rely on a high 
and stable income (despite the existence of unfavorable objective conditions to 
reproduction processes in the mining sector). 
Under these circumstances, the strategy of oil companies, as a rule, aims to increase the 
cost parameters through mergers and acquisitions. Imperfect institutional environment 
provides national vertically integrated companies the possibility to acquire assets at low 
prices. This condition reduces the incentives to improve operational efficiency, 
geological exploration, modernization of fixed assets and at the same time it offers the 
possibility of acquiring resources through the company's own funds, which allows 
insiders not to take further action in order to raise capital and to maintain control over 
the company. 
This way, mergers and acquisitions do not contribute to the effectiveness of the oil and 
gas industry. With the development of institutional environment regarding the execution 
of mergers and acquisitions of similar domestic companies that have been conducted at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, would be impossible without external financial 
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resources, which led to the creation of real incentives to improve the activity of 
companies in the following areas: geological exploration construction and 
modernization of refineries and petrochemical plants, etc.  
Mergers and acquisitions are more likely to improve the efficiency of the oil and gas 
industry by exploring the economies of scale in developing new oil and gas provinces 
given the current situation of deteriorating hydrocarbon production conditions. 
The high cost of integration transactions, characteristic of the economies with 
developed institutional environment, leads to the need to mobilize financial resources 
from the outside, which contributes to a change in the nature of ownership of 
companies, mainly operating in the interests of a wide range of shareholders of 
companies that are privately owned by individuals. 
The most common theory, which describes the effects of mergers and acquisitions, is 
the theory of synergy. Its essence lies at the confluence of the new corporation being 
able to use a wide range of benefits that arises with the pooling of resources of these 
corporations. The Integration operation is often associated to the concept of separation 
of ownership and control, as well as its connection with agency costs. In Russian 
market, it must be taken into account the specifics of the integration processes in the oil 
and gas sector due to the dynamic development of oil and gas provinces and the 
government policy for the sector. Large vertically integrated structures tend to acquire 
assets in the early stages of production and maturity such as small innovative 
companies. 
So far, the main reason for the consolidation of oil companies is the deterioration of 
hydrocarbon production conditions. As a result of mergers and acquisitions, companies 
seem able to accumulate a significant amount of money needed for the development of 
new provinces. 
Another feature is the acquisition by major holdings of oil and gas assets of related 
companies (refining, petrochemical, power, etc.) in order to minimize the risk of 
volatility in oil prices increasing thus its financial stability. 
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Acquisitions, when compared to normal economic development, as a rule, provide 
advantage in fast access to new markets and increased production. However, they 
require high costs for its implementation. Study results indicate a high risk of M&A 
transactions. According to several sources, 50-70% of the M&A deals end up in failure. 
It is necessary to consider the transformative nature of the Russian economy in the 
study of mergers and acquisitions. In our view, for a more complete explanation of the 
features of mergers and acquisitions in the oil and gas sector in Russia, it is necessary to 
consider them in the context of the institutional environment of the country, 
characterized by incompleteness and imperfection of the main business institutions, as it 
had been mentioned above. 
Contradictions and inconsistencies in the development of the state structure model and 
imperfect institutions in the field of development as well as the use of hydrocarbon 
resources have led to the institutional environment that allows subsoil users receive a 
high and steady stable profit (despite the existence of conditions objective unfavorable 
to production processes in the mining sector). This enables companies in the mining 
sector not only to cover the deficit, but also to receive a significant additional income.  
It is important to note the ease in handling business conditions in Russian energy sector, 
for example, the possibility of widespread use of various schemes of "tax 
optimization"
1
, based on agreements and individual preferences. Under these 
conditions, companies in the extractive industry, act in a greater extent on the basis of 
their own trade priorities and at the same time are "intimidated" to a much lesser degree 
by rules and regulations in the natural resources industry. 
Nevertheless, Russia is widely recognized as a country with high national and 
international levels of acquisition activity among emerging markets. However, 
concerning assets, there is a vast difference between small, medium and major 
companies. As a matter of fact, the redistribution of assets occurs in favor of companies 
with the highest administrative resources.  
                                                          
1
 According to Kiymaz (1994), a merger will create wealth to stockholder whenever the tax liability of the 
combination is smaller than the sum of the tax liabilities of the two individual firms. This situation may 
occur if one firm had generated a loss and the other a profit. 
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The encouragement of using M&A to a higher discrepancy between companies reflects 
a country with unfair competitiveness, which has hostile ways of acquire assets to raise 
funds. Actually, major companies buy assets from small and medium companies with 
the aim of resale to great investors. In a field of large competitive disparities, there is a 
speedy and easy way to access resources and assets. 
Therefore, that high discrepancy mentioned above is due to the acquisition of small and 
medium companies and assets. Thereby, it stresses the need of excluding the minority 
shareholders of subsidiaries of oil and gas exploration and of acquiring assets according 
to their own interests.  
Hence, as it happens in emerging economies, in Russia, the internationalization is an 
important element to the enhancement of the competitiveness and to the company’s 
growth.  Moreover, it allows purchase of assets concerning spheres of influence of oil 
and gas explorations distributed on a geographical basis. 
To increase the efficiency of the energy sector is necessary to implement a series of 
measures to correct the deficiencies of the existing institutional environment and to 
create conditions in which economic agents would be relatively more attracted to invest 
in their own development (geological exploration, improvements in refineries the 
development and introduction of new technologies) and not to capture and transfer 
assets. Following this, the ongoing integration of operations would lead to a more 
efficient sector and increase the competitiveness of domestic companies in global 
markets. 
In order to enable M&A contribute to the development of the oil and gas sector in 
accordance with the interests of society, the state could adopt following measures 
presented in the table 1 below. 
In a general way, the measures to be created must aim the promotion of a competitive 
market and the development of closer business of a company in the considered market. 
However, it is not enough to have the so-called rules of the game, you must be able to 
validate whether they are fulfilled. 
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Table 1: Changes to Institutional Environment 
Rules of the game The control rules 
 The use of a differentiated approach to 
taxation as opposed to "fixed rate", 
currently in force. 
 Formation of the technical regulations 
system (standard requirements) for subsoil 
users, preventing the destructive use of 
hydrocarbon resources during extraction, 
damaging this way the environment. 
 Creation of legal obstacles to the use of 
transfer prices, which allows companies to 
"optimize" the tax deductions. 
 Encourage competition in the sector, 
particularly by increasing penalties for 
violation of the antitrust laws. 
 Establishment of legal barriers to hostile 
takeovers. 
 Creation of legal incentives for the 
creation of public companies with a 
transparent ownership structure. 
 Implementation in domestic companies of 
foreign standards of corporate governance. 
 Support for small and medium enterprises 
operating more effectively in the most 
superfluous deposit’s levels. 
 Encourage innovation levels. 
 Promote the development of new oil and 
gas provinces. 
 
 Create an effective system of protection of 
property rights for all investors. 
 Eliminate the possibility of selective 
application of the rules and regulations 
that govern the activities of companies. 
 Ensure equal access for all investors to 
use subsoil resources on the basis of 
public tenders. 
 Ensure equal access of all producers for 
energy installations, transport and general 
services, such as equitable access to all 
subsoil use systems (concessions, 
production sharing agreements, other 
types of licensing agreements). 
 Monitor and control (in accordance with 
the license agreements and project 
documents) development and production 
processes according to a range of 
indicators such as exhaustion of reserves, 
well production rates, the quality of 
products produced, costs subsoil; 
environmental measures, among others. 
Thereby taking more into account the 
interests of the state as the owner of 
mineral resources and limiting the 
opportunistic behavior of firms in the 
development of subsoil deposits. 
 Enhance the role of regions in the 
allocation of mineral exploration rights 
and increase their participation in the 
process of monitoring the conduct under 
conditions of use of the underground. 
 Increase the transparency of the auctions 





2.4 Similar studies  
M&A is known to be able to restructure the domestic market much faster and deeper 
than the normal course of the economy and the entry and exit process. However, in our 
bibliographic research no empirical evidence was found about the effectiveness of 
market for corporate control in Russia. In general, the literature concludes that M&A 
increase value of target firms. Nevertheless, the outcome is less clear for acquirers. In 
fact, regardless of several years of evidence demonstrating that most acquisitions do not 
create value for the acquiring company’s shareholders, managers continue to make 
more and bigger deals every year. Figure 3 presents a summary made by Kay (1995) of 
evaluations made on M&A activity. 
There are several ways to analyze performance of acquirers. However, we have to take 
into account if the companies in our sample are privately held or are public. In the last 
case, the most common method used is the event study methodology which uses 
abnormal returns as a measure (M. Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Abnormal 
Returns isolates the effect of other movements in common market event. In general 
terms, usually it can be used two different measures of aggregated abnormal returns in 
event study analysis, cumulating abnormal returns and the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return. 
Determining whether mergers and acquisitions create shareholder value is challenging. 
The greater the success of the post-merger integration the more difficult it becomes to 
measure the value added by the merger. As a result most empirical studies conducted by 
financial economists focus on the stock market response a few days before and after the 
announcement date of the merger. While the window is short the effect on the stock 
price of the bidder and the target is based on long term expectations. The market’s 
routinely negative response to M&A activity reflects investors’ skepticism about the 
likelihood that the acquirer will be able to maintain the original values of the businesses 








In our case we are not able to use market based information because most of our sample 
are privately held companies, this means that we have to use financial indicators based 
on the accounting information in order to perform our analysis. 
Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) argue that emerging market acquirers suffer from the 
inability to leverage value due to low M&A experience and capabilities, especially 
when making international acquisitions. This conclusion comes from a sample of 609 
Russian acquirers for the period between 1999 and 2008. Hence our intention is to test 
if the results maintain or change with the time passing.  
Given that the analysis is over the long term performance
2
, authors were not able to 
evaluate the effects of deals made in 2007 and 2008
3
. Hence, we will simulate the study 
developed by the authors; however, we will take advantage of the more recent data 
available and see the results on those important years for the market of corporate control 
in Russia. 
                                                          
2
 In case of long term performance, the measure is taken over two to three years to give the acquiring 
company time to demonstrate action. 
3
 As it can be seen in the introduction chapter, the statistics indicate that 2007 and 2008 are the years with 
higher number of deals. 
Figure 3: Merger & Acquisition Evaluations (Kay, 1995). 
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Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) used the Return on Assets (RoA) as an indicator for 
the performance of acquirers and non-acquiring firms. They found rather negative 
effects associated with acquisitions. At best, acquisitions do not destroy value. 
However, they show that firm resources are of relevance and can be leveraged in 
domestic deals to improve the impact of acquisitions.  
Moreover, those findings suggest that emerging market firms suffer from the inability to 
leverage value due to low M&A experience. Interestingly, authors found a positive 
interaction between domestic and cross-border deals in acquisition programs. Also, 
high-tech firms seem to be able to draw larger benefits from cross-border transactions 
than domestic ones, taking advantage of new market opportunities abroad. Finally, they 
do not find evidence that agency problems are the driving force of the negative long-
term performance effects of acquisitions.  
The table 2 summarizes the theoretical overview made in this section. Fundamentally 
the first thing that stands out in this table is the lack of literature on emerging market’s 
presence and performance in M&A activity. Once again, we will explore this deficiency 
by following the framework of Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) and focus our work on 
Russian main economy driver – Oil and Gas Industry. 
The table 2 display several empirical studies and summarize the operating performance 
measures used in each of them. In our case it is very difficult to use some of those, for 
example, CAR (cumulative abnormal returns) because there are only few listed firms in 
Russian economy. Nevertheless, even those that are listed do not have liquidity in 
financial market. To overstep this limitation we will use accounting data to evaluate the 
long-term impact of acquisitions. 
This work aims to add to the existing literature on M&A effects in emerging market 
firms by focusing on long term performance, contrasting with works based on stock 
returns around the announcement date to access value effects (Morck and Yeung 1992, 




Table 2: Theoretical background - M&A – Summary Table 
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RoA M&A destroys value but deal 
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In cross-border deals targets gain to a 
larger degree than in domestic deals. 
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emerging market firm acquisition to 
acquisitions that the market reaction 
to acquisitions of targets in developed 
markets is positive, while it is 
negative to acquisitions in other 










The results show that mergers on 
average do result in significant 
increases in profits, but reduce the 




3. Methodological Aspects 
In this chapter will be covered the methodology used in the study. The framework is the 
research developed by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012). They investigated the long-
term impact of domestic and international acquisitions, initiated by Russians firms, on 
the operating performance. 
3.1 Research Question 
Before explore the empirical part of this dissertation it is important to mention again the 
research question that was presented in the introductory chapter. The main aim of this 
work is to answer to three sub questions.  
First of all we will try to understand if and under which conditions M&A deals benefit 
the performance of energy industry acquirers in Russia. Secondly, it is important to 
know which are the deal drivers in Oil and Gas industry in Russia. Finally our main 
intention is to analyze how different deal and firm level characteristics moderate the 
effects of acquisitions. 
In order to answer these questions we will develop a model which explains the 
operational performance of a company through several firm and deal characteristics, 
which will be explained in detail below. 
3.2 Sample 
At this point we are facing one main problem, the availability of the data. Since the 
major part of Russians companies is not listed, we need to develop our analysis on 
accounting information. In order to do so, we intend to extract information about 
Russians acquirers from Orbis database.  Before that, we will use Zephyr database to 
identify Russian acquirer firms.  
Zephyr and Orbis are both provided by Bureau Van Dijk. Zephyr is the most 
comprehensive database of deal information, contains information on M&A, IPO, 
private equity and venture capital deals. In addition to the deal overview and 
documentation about it, this database contains also some information about deal 
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interveners. It covers over thirteen years’ of history for deals around the world, and an 
even longer history for deals with a European counterpart. Zephyr was used to identify 
companies that in the selected time period (1999-2013) made merger or acquisition 
deals on the buyer role.  
On the other hand, Orbis contains information from a diverse range of sources on nearly 
150 million companies worldwide, both listed and unlisted companies, with an 
emphasis on private company information. This is a plus for two reasons. First, because 
the financial market in Russia is not very liquid and there are only few companies that 
are listed
4
; and second, because private company information is more difficult to obtain 
as the legal obligation to file accounts varies widely from country to country. Orbis was 
used to obtain accounting information on selected companies. 
The idea is to select a panel design where firm and deal characteristics will be modeled 
as time-varying influences on performance. Therefore we will analyze a period of 15 
years, from 1999 until 2013, to give us a sufficient time window to access operational 
performance of acquirers. Moreover, we will limit our sample to acquisition with more 
than 50% of equity, because only in these cases it is likely the observable impact of the 
bidder. 
Note that within the analysis there have been selected companies from energy sector 
(NACE Rev.2) based in Russia. Initially was selected a sample of 1,781 deals from 
2002 to 2011 carried out by 445 Russian companies. However, in the progress of our 
analysis it was necessary to clean the data and reduce our sample. We omit 39 
companies due to problems of lack of the accounting data and acquisition reporting. 
Also, we limit our analysis to acquisitions with single acquirer in order to avoid 
problems in data processing and exclude from our sample financial institutions as 
partners and international acquirers, taking away from our initial sample another 182 
companies.  
                                                          
4
 Financial markets in emerging countries have several structural deficiencies, such as very high 
concentration and low liquidity. 
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Following the exercise described above we get 224 companies. Our final sample is 
composed by the complete information on the explanatory variables available for the 
period from 1999 until 2013. 
In order to trace the acquisition behavior of the energy sector in Russia we counted the 
number of deals per year and compared it with the overall period average (178,1). In our 
sample we are able to identify two peaks of M&A activity, first in 2004 and second one 
in 2008, both of them correspond to the financial crisis. The decrease in the number of 
deals only in the years following the peaks can be explained by the fact that in 2004 and 
2008 there were pre-crisis deals still ongoing. The drop of economic growth leads to the 
lack of funding and consequently companies are obligated to rethink their business 
strategies and tighten their belts.  
 
Table 3: Evolution of number of deals per 
year in Russian Energy Sector
5
 
2002 88  
2003 100 ↑ 
2004 159 ↑ 
2005 114 ↓ 
2006 107 ↓ 
2007 237 ↑ 
2008 358 ↑ 
2009 289 ↓ 
2010 214 ↓ 
2011 115 ↓ 
 
Looking from the other angle to our sample, we are able to identify other phenomenon 
on the Russian market for corporate control, multiple acquisitions. In our final sample, 
of the 224 acquirers, 103 were single acquirers (in our search period 103 in 224 
companies held only one deal), while 74 have acquired at least four firms. Some of the 
firms have 67, 70 or even 80 deals between 2002 and 2011. However there is one 
                                                          
5
 NACE Rev.2: 06 - Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, 351 - Electric power generation, 
transmission and distribution, 352 - Manufacture of gas; distribution of gaseous fuels through mains. 
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company which beats everyone, Gazprom, it is a Russian energy company, the largest 
company in Russia and is the largest exporter of natural gas in the world, which gives it 
the fifteenth position in the ranking of world's largest companies. Over the studied 
period, Gazprom had acquired 144 companies. 
It is obvious that Russian market for corporate control evolved exponentially. However, 
in terms of internationalization there are still many obstacles. In our sample, in about 
93% of deals the target company’s country was Russia. Of the share of cross-border 
acquisitions 3% of targets were based within countries that formerly were part of the 
Soviet Union, these deals can be used as a proxy for domestic acquisitions because of 
the cultural proximity, which facilitate the pre- and post-deal.  
Overall, only 4% of our sample are cross-border deals, which is very small number, 
however can be explained by the industry in analysis.  Russia is very rich in natural 
resources, and there exists a lack of incentives to go abroad while they have it under 
their nose. 
We can explain the short number of cross-border deals in the sector by explaining that 
the major reasons for firms to move abroad are to acquire additional resources and skills 
that are not available on the domestic factor market, however in Russia there is a huge 
amount of natural resources and opportunities to explore and this way centralize the 
business. 
Regarding to the M&A variables we considered several count variables. To capture the 
effects of the M&A deals we counted for each deal the number of deals before and after 
it in order to see the long-term impact. We have to take into account that market for 
corporate control is a very fresh phenomenon in Russian economy and the data 
availability and natural growth rate are both influenced by this. We used variable that 
count number of all deals together and another that count separately for domestic and 
cross-border deals. Within the second one we also distinguished between deals with 
target being from a former Soviet Union country and the rest of the world in order to 




Besides the fact that share price changes are based on the information available on the 
stock market and sometimes are affected by another factors as market swings, fads, 
euphoria, in our particular case we have the problem of an emerging country market, 
undeveloped and with low liquidity.  
In order to overcome this problem and to answer to the research questions we followed 
the empirical analysis carried out by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012). We examined the 
operating rather than stock market returns-based performance and we restricted our 
long-term performance analysis to an accounting profitability measure, return on assets 
(RoA), an indicator of how profitable a company is relative to its total assets. RoA gives 
an idea as to how efficient management is at using its assets to generate earnings. This 
approach also allows us to study private and unlisted companies which constitute the 
majority of our sample. 
RoA is calculated by dividing a company's EBIT by its total assets. Financial analysts 
often confuse EBIT to operating income. Indeed, these values are often so closely 
related they can be used interchangeably without causing any accounting issues. 
Besides, this way we exclude the possibility of different applications of accounting 
methods regarding depreciation and amortization which can lead to the problem of 
comparability through firms. Following that we assume the following function: 
 
   
Where, profitability of a company i at time t is a function of a vector of firm 
determinants of performance (𝑋𝑖,𝑡), vector of count variables to measure the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of acquisition of the firm (𝐴𝑖,𝑡), and year dummy 
for the macroeconomic shocks (𝑇𝑡). Note that all of our monetary data is expressed in 
thousands of euros. 
By combining several variables, which will be explained in detail later in this section, it 
was possible to create three models: 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑋𝑖,𝑡;  𝐴𝑖,𝑡;  𝑇𝑡) 
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In order to take into account the dynamic effects in performance we included on our 
firm determinants vector the lagged dependent variable. This way we are telling that 
profitability of a company can be predicted based on its past values. 
In addition to that, we assumed that the logarithm of the firm’s turnover can be used as 
a proxy of the firm size. We expect a positive relation between firm size and 
profitability due to the concept known as economies of scale which can be found in the 
traditional neo classical view of the firm. In contrast with this, alternative theories warn 
that large companies are under the control of managers pursuing an aim of self-interest 
and utility maximization which leads to the management that can replace the 
companies’ goals by personal profit maximization. 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑁º 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑁º 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑁º 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑁º 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝑁º 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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Firm size 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟) 
Solvency ratio 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Liquidity ratio 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 




In order to measure the firm performance, we also used the solvency ratio that gives us 
the measure of the ability of a company to meet its debt and other obligations. In other 
words, it indicates if a company owns more that it owes. To calculate the ratio we used 
the sum of current and non-current liabilities to a firm’s total assets. This way it is 
possible to see the percentage of a company’s assets that have been financed with debt. 
The lower solvency ratio of a company indicates a greater likelihood of company to 
externally finance firm activities and therefore it features financial resources to more 
profitable deals. Hereby we expect a negative relation of the solvency ratio with the 
profitability of a company. 
Liquidity ratio is another term that refers to the financial health of a company, the 
difference from the previous ratio is that liquidity refers to the ability to pay short-term 
obligations. Besides that, represents the capability of the company to sell assets 
promptly and raise cash. To calculate the ratio we used the difference between current 
assets and stocks to current liabilities. This ratio measures the ability to meet company’s 
short-term obligations with its most liquid assets. A high liquidity ratio represents a 
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surplus of financial resources that can be used in two different ways, either to invest 
well and increase company’s profitability or it can be spent taking into account vain 
manager desires. In this way we are not able to identify any trend until see both possible 
effects. 
Apart from the ratios described above we also included the market share of a firm. At 
this point we assumed that the total sales of our sample correspond to the total sales of 
the industry due to the lack of reliable data. This indicator was included to provide a 
general idea of the size of a company to the sample and its competitors since getting an 
accurate measure of market share is very difficult. However, by comparing the 
company’s sales growth with the industry´s growth we can see whether market share of 
a company is increasing or decreasing. Market share is a key indicator of the 
effectiveness of the company’s strategy, so it is expected positive relation with 
operating performance. However, we have to be aware of the agency conflicts and the 
influence of the political interests in the state owned companies, which can lead to the 
negative relation between the performance of the company and the market share of the 
same.   
Given the importance of the state enterprises in Russia it is important for our analysis to 
include a variable which reflects this information. To this end, we used a tool of the 
database Orbis and extracted the GUO - The GUO is the Global Ultimate Owner 
which corresponds to the minimum percentage that must characterize the path from a 
subject Company up to its Ultimate owner: 50.01%. We used a dummy variable and 
attribute the value 1 for Public authority, State, Government type of company. On the 
other hand the zero value is related to private companies. The conflict of interest 
resultant from the state’s dual role as a shareholder and regulator can influence the 
content of corporate laws to the detriment of outside investor protection and efficiency 
and can lead to the lower performance via lack of incentive. 
Regarding to the measurement of M&A activity, dependent on the model, the vector 
𝐴𝑖,𝑡 includes several count variables in order to access whether the M&A activity have 
impact on the operational performance of the intervenients. With the view to catch the 
impact of the deals on long term, we have to use a cumulate number of acquisitions of 
29 
each firm for each year and the three previous years. In our base estimation we used one 
or two of those count variables. For example, in the model I we used two count 
variables, one counting the number of domestic M&A deals and other counting the 
number of cross-border deals. On the other hand, in the model II it was used only one 
variable counting the total number of M&A deals for each company. However, in order 
to analyze the influence of deal characteristics on operational performance we estimated 
three more models where we included other count variables regarding the type of 
industry and the country of the target company. 
 
















𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑅 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑜𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽4𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑛𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑀&𝐴′𝑠𝑖,𝑡




One of the advantages of using panel data is the relief of individual heterogeneity 
(distinguishing characteristics of individuals). However, this type of base for analysis 
presents its own problems since the amount of information increases dramatically 
through the cross sections. 
In our analysis we have to be aware of the fact that strategy choice is endogenous and 
self-selected, since those are a different perspective of the same concept - firms select 
strategies based on their characteristics and industry boundaries, meaning that it is 
expected that companies select the deals that result in the greatest expected return. As 
Shaver (1998) we used a specific econometric method that has been developed to 
account for this effect (Heckman 1979). This author highlighted how self-selection on 
unobservable characteristics can bias strategy performance estimates.  Note that 
empirical models that do not account for this and regress performance measures on 
strategy choice variables are potentially misspecified and their conclusions might be 
incorrect. 
In other hand, dynamic models show the most common nature of economic relations. In 
general this relationship can be represented by a dependent variable offset as a 
regressor, as is the case of our model. This makes the OLS estimators biased (due to the 
lagged dependent variable correlation with the error) and requires the choice of 
instrumental variables to ensure consistency and the efficiency of estimation (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2010). 
In order to overcome this situation we will use the IV method. The regression of 
instrumental variables (IV’s) consists on a method that provides consistent estimators 
when the error and a repressor variable are correlated (Mátyás 1999). This correlation is 
determined by three reasons: omission of relevant variables in the model, errors in 
variables (inaccuracy in the calculation) or simultaneity (Y influences X, but X also 
influences Y). 
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However, IV's have to meet two conditions: they have to be relevant (should be 
correlated with the explanatory variable) and have to be exogenous (it cannot be 
correlated with the error). 
The choice of the method of estimation should be made based on their asymptotic 
properties. Since our sample meets the key condition for the use of GMM estimator, 
which following the Hansen (1982) have to be a large sample for a relatively short 
period of time, we will follow the model specified by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012). 
However, as Mátyás (1999) notes, the viability of the past values of the dependent 
variable as instruments require a number of restrictions on the covariance between the 
random disturbance term, the individual effect and the initial observations of the 
dependent variable. 
To correct heterogeneity Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose to rewrite the model in 
first differences using as a tool for our lagged dependent variable the second order lag. 
In addition to this, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a wider range of instruments 
including all past values of the dependent variable available. Moreover, Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) developed a system estimator. 
According to the theory, this method requires that a certain number of times of 
conditions are specified for the model, which would be functions of model parameters 
and data, so that their expectation is zero to the true values of the parameters. Thus, the 
estimator minimizes a particular standard sample average of the moment conditions. 
This technique allows us to handle the autocorrelation problems and heteroscedasticity 
possibly present in this sample (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
In econometric terms, we can say that the GMM estimators are known as consistent, 
asymptotically normal and efficient in the class of all evaluators who do not use any 
extra information beyond that contained in the moment conditions. 
Following Bertrand and Betschinger (2012), we apply the GMM estimator in order to 
overcome the reverse causality and correlation of the choice variable with the 
unobservable in the error term. The GMM estimator does not entail complete awareness 
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of the distribution of the data and are only needed indicated moment’s resultant from a 
core model.  
Nevertheless, multicollinearity is a common issue in regressions. It occurs when the 
independent variables have exact or almost exact linear relationship. The R² indicator is 
a useful tool in the detection of multicollinearity. If it is high but none of the regression 
coefficients is statistically significant it indicates the existence of a high linear 
relationship between independent variables. The implications in our work of the 
existence of multicollinearity can be of high standard errors or even the impossibility of 
any estimation if multicollinearity is perfect. 
Besides multicollinearity we can find other common problems in a regression as 
heteroscedasticity (strong dispersion of the data), autocorrelation and endogeneity. The 
GMM estimator has already taken the latter into account. Regarding the 
heteroscedasticity, its detection can be performed by means of a White Test, which is a 
residual test. The autocorrelation is the correlation that exists between a time series 
values observed at different time instants. We can use the Durbin-Watson test to assess 












In this chapter we are going to present our estimations with the respective obtained 
results. In the first section will be presented the estimation of the main model while the 
second section will focus on the deal characteristics in order to answer to our research 
questions mentioned above.   
4.1 Main effects 
In order to frame the results, in Table 5 are shown the descriptive statistics and 
correlations of the variables used in the regression. Table 6 contains the main results of 
the estimation. 
Following the table 6, in general way all models show that independent variables trail 
our expectations. Looking to the third model variation, it can be observed that the 
lagged dependent variable, size of the firm and cross-border deals have positive effect 
on the operational performance. On the other hand, solvency ratio, market share of the 
company, state ownership and domestic deals have negative effect on our dependent 
variable. 
Regarding the market share coefficient, it is important to refer that in this specific case, 
the energy market in Russian economy, the major companies are state-owned. The 
reason behind this is that the government wants to manipulate politically the most 
important industry of the country according to its interests. This leads to a management 
that is more concerned in political needs and government strategies instead of 
improvement of operational performance, which leads to a negative impact of market 
share on Return on Asset.      
Note that the state ownership variable is not statistically significant in our estimation, 
showing that it is not relevant on the long term performance analysis. The same happens 
for the count variable of domestic deals.  
Given the reduced number of deals for the years previous to 2005, we limited our 
estimation to 8 years, from 2005 until 2013. This way we are taking into account the 
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most important period for the market of corporate control in Russia and put aside the 
period with low M&A activity and with possible information fails. 
More importantly in our analysis, the number of cross-border deals has a positive effect 
on the operational performance of acquirers. This way, our preliminary results show the 
possibility of performance improvement for acquirers in energy industry as they 
perform cross-border deals. This positive influence can represent the contrast between 
factors that drive domestic versus cross-border deals within energy industry. It is 
important to highlight the fact that there are tax benefits for participants in an agreement 
between two different states within Russia. 
In the next section we will analyze more in detail how different deal characteristics 
affect operational performance.   
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Table 5: Summary statistics and correlations 
   Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 



















Number of M&As 4.728 11.092 91.000 0.000 1.000 
       
             
Liquidity ratio 48.065 770.427 18,991.760 0.030 0.033 1.000 
      
             
(Log) size 19.342 2.407 25.238 5.503 0.301 0.035 1.000 
     
             
Market share 0.013 0.054 0.763 0.000 0.391 -0.004 0.343 1.000 
    
             
Number of cross-
border M&As 
0.381 2.154 29.000 -5.000 0.551 -0.007 0.194 0.427 1.000 
   
             
Number of domestic 
M&As 
4.346 10.067 75.000 0.000 0.984 0.038 0.290 0.339 0.393 1.000 
  
             
Solvency ratio 0.559 0.457 7.070 0.000 -0.129 -0.074 -0.236 -0.055 -0.074 -0.126 1.000 
 
             





Table 6: Main effects of acquisitions 
      I II III 
Return on assets t-1 
 
0.289593*** 0.290549*** 0.141269*** 
   
(0.014467) (0.013235) (0.005041) 
(Log) size 
  
0.000154*** 0.000147*** 0.073563*** 
   





   
(9.14E-08) (8.77E-08) 
 Solvency ratio 
 
0.000714*** 0.000716*** -0.135856*** 
   
(1.44E-05) (1.38E-05) (0.003479) 
Market share  
 
-0.001259 0.001351 -6.563865*** 
   
(0.005245) (0.005893) (2.338260) 
State-owned company 
 
0.000406 0.000120 -1.969317 
   
(0.001234) (0.001119) (2.057006) 




    
(3.17E-06) 
 Number of domestic M&A's -6.63E-06* 
 
-0.000499 




Number of cross-border M&A's -1.01E-05 
 
0.011705*** 




      Cross-sections included 113 113 175 
Periods included 
 
8 8 8 
Instrument rank 
 
53 52 66 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.202991 0.189938 0.125082 
p-value of AR1 
 
0.0000 
  p-value of AR2   0.9456     
 
Notes: The dependent variable is EBIT normalized with total assets. Results reported in this table have been obtained 
using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported 
standard errors. The lagged dependent variable and the M&A variables are instrumented. Year and industry dummies 
are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Data is for 2005–2013. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Significance at the 10% level     * 
 Significance at the 5% level      ** 







4.2 Deal characteristics 
Table 7 presents our estimations based on several deal characteristics. The first column 
focus on the target country and this way distinguish cross-border deals on our sample 
between deals with target from former USSR countries and the rest of the world. Our 
main finding here is that only the cross-border deals with target in former USSR 
countries have significant negative impact on the operational performance of Russian 
acquirers.  
In the base model the cross border deals have positive effect. Nevertheless if we unfold 
it in former USSR countries and the rest of the world, it can be seen that the effect 
passes to negative for the target deals from the former USSR countries. This can be 
explained by the fact that the energetic industry is submissive to the will of state 
interests. Many acquisitions in these countries are made due to geographic proximity 
and the necessity of creation of new infrastructures with the intent of provision of 
support to the supply of natural resources, and not necessarily check the increase of the 
buyer's performance. 
Domestic deals and deals with targets in non-former USSR countries have no longer 
impact on our dependent variable. Anti-competition and rent-seeking purposes can 
explain this result, given the cultural and geographic proximity between Russia and this 
group.  
The second and third columns take into account the industry as a deal characteristic and 
distinguish between horizontal and vertical deals for domestic and cross-border M&A 
separately. In general way, horizontal deals exert negative impact on the dependent 
variable as opposed to vertical deals, however both significant. By looking more closely 
into the third column, our main observation is that cross-border deals within the same 
industry is the only variable that have significant negative impact on the operational 
performance. In order to understand this estimation results it is important to consider the 
industry in analysis, where horizontal deals are triggered with the purpose of creating 
monopolies and in case of cross-border deals we have to highlight the geopolitical 
issues. 
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Table 7: The role of deal-level characteristics 
  I II III 
Return on assets t-1 0.148430*** 0.134495*** 0.151210*** 
 
(0.004820) (0.004873) (0.005125) 
(Log) size 0.069133*** 0.087995*** 0.069005*** 
 
(0.000912) (0.000864) (0.000951) 
Solvency ratio -0.104095*** -0.133557*** -0.101041*** 
 
(0.004344) (0.005292) (0.004293) 




  Number of cross-border M&A's in non- 0.001229 
  former USSR countries 
 
(0.003933) 
  Number of cross-border M&A's in former  -0.011568*** 
  USSR countries 
 
(0.002616) 












 Number of domestic non-horizontal M&A's 
  
-0.000979 
   
(0.002479) 
Number of domestic horizontal M&A's 
  
-0.001418 
   
(0.001160) 
Number of cross-border horizontal M&A's 
  
-0.022677*** 
   
(0.004785) 






Cross-sections included 181 175 181 
Periods included 12 8 12 
Instrument rank 73 65 74 
p-value of Hansen statistic 0.220173 0.279542 0.211735 
p-value of AR1 0.9623 0.5358 
 p-value of AR2 0.9407 0.5661   
 
Notes: The dependent variable is EBIT normalized with total assets. Results reported in this table have been obtained 
using system GMM estimations using the two-step estimation including the Windmeijer correction to the reported 
standard errors. The lagged dependent variable and the M&A variables are instrumented. Year and industry dummies 
are not reported. AR1 and AR2 report the p-values of the tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in 
the first-differenced residuals. The Hansen statistic reports the p-value of the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions. Data is for 2005–2013. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 Significance at the 10% level     * 
 Significance at the 5% level      ** 





Our main findings are relied on the positive effect of cross-border deals on the 
operational performance of Russian acquirers. However, when we look closer into the 
deal characteristic, we found that the positive effect is no longer significant. But cross-
border deals within the same industry and in former USSR countries have significant 
negative impact on the performance of acquirers. In order to understand this estimation 
results it is important to consider the industry in analysis, where horizontal deals are 
triggered with the purpose of creating monopolies and in case of cross-border deals we 
have to highlight the geopolitical issues.  
According to Forbes magazine (2011), Russia's long-term challenges include a 
shrinking workforce, a high level of corruption, difficulty in accessing capital for 
smaller non-energy companies and poor infrastructure in need of large investments. The 
legal framework in relation to M&A deals is still developing with the growing 
adherence of the national companies when considering the effects and benefits of the 
strategy. However, Russian law still shows some rigidity and ambiguity in the area of 
M&A. Besides, the market for corporate control is less sophisticated, regulatory regime 
is complex, unclear, unpredictable and yet of rigid nature (Goldsblat 2010). 
It is necessary to point out, especially in the case of emerging markets such as Russia, 
the possible increase in the risk of having incomplete samples or severe problems on 
data collection, as well as the importance of measurement errors. Given the institutional 
flaws and the specifics of Russian law, the available financial information is expected to 
be unreliable.  
However, we emphasize the necessity of research in emerging markets since the 
comparison of the results of conducted studies with the studies in the developed markets 
can assist the understanding of the behavior of companies, investors and markets. 
Russian market is one of the largest and most dynamic of all in Eastern Europe, yet it is 
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